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SCHMIDT FACES OPPOSITION TO COUNTERARMING AT SPD CONGRESS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Mar 82 p 3

/Article by Claus Gennrich, datelined Bonn, 24 March: "The Opponents of Counterarming Have No Concern for the SPD's Ability to Govern"/

/Text/ After the Landtag election results, depressing indeed for the Lower Saxony SPD, Federal Chancellor Schmidt is confronted with a test of strength vis-a-vis his own party. The motions have been submitted for the Munich party congress to be held in April; they show that Schmidt will have to gird himself for an assault on his defense policy, carried on jointly with Genscher's FDP. And also in Munich, immediately before the congress meets, the SPD left will be holding a meeting of the "Frankfurt Group" to put the finishing touches to a group motion designed to force a change in the party executive's platform. Saarland politician Lafontaine headed the section preparing the finished version of parts of this planned group motion. It includes the demand of the Saarland SPD and the Schleswig-Holstein Land federation either completely to abandon Western counterarming or at least for the time being to renounce the emplacement of American weapons and the technical preparations for this emplacement. Brezhnev's announcement of a conditional Soviet moratorium seems to have given them further impetus. It is reported that contributions by former permanent FRG representative in the GDR Gaus have been incorporated in the draft motion. They are said to be particularly weighty.

Lafontaine has demonstrated that he is unimpressed by the concern about the party's ability to govern. In the magazine KONKRET he stated that a continuation of the Bonn coalition would no longer make much sense after an election defeat in Hesse; a new "program discussion" would then have to begin in the SPD. The party must not be allowed to continue "stumbling from one compromise to the other." The "forward projection"--speak change--predicted by Lafontaine for the Godesberg program would involve more than defense issues. It is to be assumed that the attitude to Moscow, Washington and NATO (which cling to counterarming) would be a crucial element in such a program discussion--no longer interested in governing--at least if Lafontaine and Eppler have their way. The party congress is intended to be a way station on this route.

Nevertheless the party leaders hope to gain a majority for the policy they champion--the SPD should welcome American-Soviet missile negotiations in Geneva and wait upon their progress until the fall of 1983, at which time a party congress would have to settle the SPD attitude toward the emplacement of Western missiles. The usefulness

of a (time) limited moratorium should be considered only once the "negotiations are in an advanced phase." On the other hand the SPD left has adopted the view of Schleswig-Holstein Land chairman Jansen and Bremen Senator Scherf, according to whom it would be necessary in direct confrontation to demand the "cancellation of the counterarming provisions of the NATO dual resolution and a stop to the preparations for emplacing medium-range missiles in Western Europe." In case of defeat, the left agreed on a tactical variant, a return to Lafontaine's plan for an emplacement stop for a limited time only. Lafontaine wishes to link a moratorium and a stop on the preparations for emplacement with a request to Moscow to the effect that the Soviet Union reduce their medium-range missiles to the 1978 status.

Lafontaine and Eppler explained that their moratorium proposal is designed to build a "bridge" also for non-left party congress delegates and thereby "torpedo" the NATO dual resolution. The attention of the Bonn party leaders is therefore primarily directed at the likely results of voting on the moratorium especially after Brezhnev's latest announcement. This is the point where the greatest uncertainty prevails. SPD politicians who count themselves on the left but consider the NATO dual resolution necessary--such as Bundestag deputy Voigt--accuse Lafontaine of inconsistency. They say that he has lost credibility among the left, because he frequently changed his standpoint. First Lafontaine advocated sea-based Western missiles instead of land-based rockets, later he championed the total rejection of counterarming, and now he is favoring a moratorium while he aims, at one and the same time, to hide his goal of preventing counterarming and to reveal it.

Voigt and Ehmke are in a minority within the Frankfurt Group. Voigt therefore expects that the left "confessors" are unlikely to follow Lafontaine and Eppler in Munich. These "confessors" ardently wish for a complete and frank rejection of counterarming so as to have an easier time arguing the point to their respective rank and file. Voigt foresees the danger that many other SPD lefts may have pursued a rejectionist line for merely tactical reasons and reckoned with defeat at the party congress. Later--for example at the crucial 1983 party congress--they would thus be committed to the line of total rejection. By this means sheer tactics might turn into a mandatory political factor at a later stage, quite apart from the fervent wishes of some leftists. This seems to hold true also with regard to the majority of the parliamentary left within the SPD Bundestag fraction. It is widely understood that this is opposed to Schmidt's counterarming policy except when parliamentary voting is involved.

Voigt's opinion is shared by SPD defense expert Horn who accuses Saarbruecken chief mayor Lafontaine of wishing to deprive the West of an essential negotiating base in Geneva. Lafontaine, he says, cites only the numbers of Soviet missiles, not the far higher figure of warheads; he does not distinguish between SS-20 missiles and older weapons. Lafontaine is also accused of deliberately omitting to count many Soviet aircraft while adding the independent British and French potentials to the American side, although these fighting forces are largely sea-based and, moreover, included in strategic (that is not Euro-strategic) calculations. Moreover, Lafontaine demonstrates the profoundest possible mistrust of Washington and an utterly naive confidence in Moscow. Voigt expects that Lafontaine and Eppler will scare off centrist SPD delegates by the suggestion of the eventual goal of their moratorium proposal, thereby making it easier for the federal chancellor to make his arguments prevail in Munich.

175 Motions Against the Federal Government's Defense Policy

Nonetheless it is widely assumed in the SPD that Eppler will try to whip up emotions in Munich, increasing the confusion by invoking the proposals of former American Vice-President Mondale regarding a worldwide general moratorium. With Munich in view, deputy Maenning, SPD fraction chairman of the subcommittee on disarmament and arms control, reminded delegates that Brezhnev's offer of a moratorium was no more than a variation on earlier Soviet proposals. The SPD should keep in mind that "we do not merely want temporary postponements of medium-range armament, we want negotiations aiming at a zero settlement." Not much time is left to the end of 1983--the date of emplacement in case no agreement is achieved in Geneva. Now that negotiations are proceeding, "talks on moratoria would merely take up valuable months and not advance the achievement of the main point, the desired zero settlement." The Federal Government already explained that Brezhnev's announcement aimed merely to prevent the emplacement of Western weapons in Europe, regardless of the outcome of the Geneva negotiations, and to maintain the current imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union.

Will these arguments impress many on the SPD left? The flood of motions for Munich indicates the contrary. Submitted were 330 motions on foreign, peace, and defense issues; 175 of these dealt mainly with counterarming, mostly from a negative aspect. Basic features are either complete rejection of the "counterarming provisions" of the NATO dual resolution or the advocacy of a moratorium; often the two are linked. Moreover many call for the inclusion of British and French missiles in the negotiations and a ban on the modernization of American "forward weapons systems" on submarines and aircraft. Even disregarding the combination of all these points, the proposals flatly contradict the defense policy of the government and the West. To be thus interpreted are motions from six Land federations: Bavaria (no preparations for emplacement, moratorium inclusion in the negotiations of all medium-range weapons on the Western side); Hamburg (moratorium--while negotiations proceed there may be no emplacement and modernization by new and already available short-range and medium-range missiles and forward based systems"); Bremen (complete rejection); Saar (Lafontaine's proposals plus nuclear weapon free zone); Schleswig-Holstein (rejection), Berlin (moratorium, praise for the peace movement).

The following districts oppose government policy: East Westphalia-Lippe, Hesse-South, Lower Bavaria-Upper Palatinate, Palatinate (moratorium, nuclear-free zone); Brunswick (moratorium); Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau, South Bavaria, Lower Rhine (moratorium) and Hanover (moratorium). The opposition motions include resolutions by many sub-districts, for example: Bochum (moratorium), Mettmann (moratorium), Aachen (moratorium), Hochsauerland (moratorium), Nienburg, Erlangen, Hoexter, Herfurt, Munich and Munich-Rural, Duisburg, Harburg, Wesel, Paderborn, Frankfurt, Minden-Luebbecke, Nuremberg, Kassel, Duesseldorf (moratorium), Munster, Wolfsburg (moratorium), Kleve (no preparation for emplacement) and Wiesbaden. Some subdistricts such as Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Munich actually submitted several motions with the same thrust. Even greater is the number of local federations wishing to obstruct Schmidt.

It is characteristic for a lot of these motions that concern is expressed first about the United States and only second about the Soviet Union. Washington's failure to ratify the SALT II treaty is cited as the reason for rejecting counterarming. Schmidt's defense policy, based on his definition of the military balance in Europe, is either questioned or contested. A Schleswig-Holstein motion offers a good

example. This claims that both superpowers imperil peace; negotiations should be carried on about the entire nuclear potential in Europe, not only about medium-range weapons, "taking into account" the Soviet proposal for a moratorium; the goal is a zone in Europe free of all nuclear weapons. In addition to Moscow and Washington the other countries of the Warsaw Pact should participate in the negotiations. To be demanded are the "cancellation of the counterarming provisions of the NATO dual resolution and a stop to the preparations for the emplacement of these medium-range missiles in Western Europe."

Land chairman Jansen must have thought that he could keep a grip on his federation only by sounding this kind of note. Whether, on the other hand, Schmidt will succeed in reversing this mood in Munich seems all the more doubtful since Egon Bahr said: "The discussion of a moratorium has been made much easier by the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union: A Western equivalent such as proposed by the party executive has practical merit only before emplacement takes place in Europe at the end of 1983." If the federal chancellor were to be defeated on this issue by his own party, he could not really rely on an affirmative vote by the SPD Bundestag fraction. Many deputies would be facing a conflict of loyalties when thinking of their local federations. The federal chancellor is bound to find the going very hard indeed.

11698

CSO: 3103/372

RESULTS OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM ANNOUNCED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 3 Feb 82 p 15

[Text] As a merciless campaign to eradicate terrorism continues, some results of anti-terrorist activities between 12 September 1980 and 19 January 1982 have been announced. It has been revealed that during this 71 week period an average of 90.8 incidents took place each week. An average of 4.7 persons per week have been losing their lives as the result of these incidents while the weekly average of those who have been injured stands at 10.8. It has been announced that a weekly average of 8,644 weapons and 34,858 rounds of ammunition have been captured during this period. Figures for the period between January 19 and January 26, 1982, represented decreases of 78 percent in the number of incidents, 100 percent in the number of those killed, and 91 percent in the number of those who received personal injury. The figures during this period also indicated an 84 percent decrease in the number of captured weapons while the amount of captured ammunition decreased by 79 percent.

According to information obtained from the authorities, the period between 26 December 1978 and 11 September 1980 saw the capture of 21,505 handguns and automatic pistols, 8,021 rifles and 2,353,365 rounds of ammunition. In contrast, the 502 day period between the operation of 12 September 1980 and 27 January 1982 saw the capture of 687,297 handguns and automatic pistols, 87,838 infantry rifles and automatic hunting rifles, 3,118,134 rounds of ammunition, 2 mortar guns, 23 rocket launchers, 77 rounds of rocket launcher ammunition, 5 antiaircraft weapons and 84 wireless sets.

Since the operation of 12 September 1980, military courts have received case files for 28,742 cases. Military courts have reached verdicts concerning 20,485 of these case files. Allegations of torture have led to the opening of 390 case files. Prosecution was deemed to be unnecessary in 115 of these cases while 37 case files were forwarded to the courts. The number of persons who are on trial in connection with these cases is at 65. The number includes 25 individuals who are currently in detention.

The total number of individuals who are currently being held in correctional facilities is at 24,377. Of these, 13 are former members of parliament while 64 are labor union officials. In addition, 7,032 individuals currently remain under observation.

By 25 January 1982, 71 death penalty verdicts had been submitted to the High Court of Military Administration in connection with cases being heard by Military Courts of Martial Law. The High Court of Military Administration upheld 27 of the sentences and overturned 21. Currently, 23 death penalty verdicts are being examined by the High Court of Military Administration. Of the 27 death penalty verdicts that have been upheld by the High Court of Military Administration, 21 have been forwarded to the National Security Council. The National Security Council has upheld 14 of these death penalty verdicts and 10 sentences have been carried out. Four individuals who have been sentenced to die are currently escapees from justice. It had been stated earlier that Isa Armagan who is one of these escapees from justice has been captured in Iran and that efforts are underway for his return to Turkey.

9491

CSO: 4654/179

BRIEFS

INCREASED EXPLORATION ON FAEROES, GREENLAND--On the international level there is rising interest again in acquiring drilling permits in areas around the Faeroe Islands and Greenland. The Faeroese government has received 25 inquiries from both Danish and foreign firms wishing drilling permits. Even though it will be a long time before real explorations for oil and natural gas can occur in Greenland, mounting interest can be detected, especially with regard to areas in East Greenland. As a kind of forerunner, there will be tests of seismic exploration methods during the early summer in regions of Jameson Land. They will be conducted under the leadership of Arco Greenland, Inc. and Nordic Mining Company. The companies have received permission to conduct a small trial program. [By Helle Ravn Larsen] [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Mar 82 p 5] 6578

CSO: 3106/92

TINDEMANS ON EC-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Brussels SPECIAL/L'EVENTAIL in French 19-25 Mar 82 pp 4-5

[Interview with Belgian Minister of Foreign Relations Leo Tindemans by Henri Vellut; date and place not specified]

[Text] Belgian Minister of Foreign Relations Leo Tindemans had scarcely returned from the United States--where he had met with President Reagan, General Haig, and top officials in charge of economic policy--before he left again, this time for Japan, where he held talks at the highest level. He very kindly consented to talk to our special correspondent in Tokyo concerning what he had learned there.

[Leo Tindemans] I was invited to Japan in my capacity as chairman of the European Community's Council of Foreign Ministers. My role was not to negotiate but to explain to my Japanese interlocutors the concerns being caused among us and our European partners by the serious deficit in our trade with them--450 billion Belgian francs last year, including 40 billion for Belgium alone!

It was also my mission to study the possibility of developing political cooperation between the EC and Japan.

As far as the first part of my mission was concerned, I noted that the criticisms of Japan's economic policy that are formulated in Europe and the United States have a real effect in that country. Some of my interlocutors sought to refute the criticisms, while others assured me that steps have already been taken to respond to them. Incidentally, a sort of ombudsman has been appointed, and complaints can be addressed to him. That specialist is obliged to answer.

The Japanese Government has also just appointed an influential member of Parliament, Mr Esaki, to go on a factfinding mission to the United States and Europe. He will contact the EEC authorities and those in certain member states and submit a report on the criticisms he hears.

Japan's relations with the United States are currently somewhat strained as the result of a bill currently before the U.S. Congress that would impose reciprocity rules in the field of trade between the two countries.

The issue is of such concern to the Japanese that the former minister of foreign affairs attended the press conference I held for the Japanese press. He pointed out to me that economic problems should never be viewed from a bilateral standpoint, but should be considered within a multilateral framework.

I answered by saying that the continuation of such a seriously negative trade balance between the European Community and Japan would eventually create an intolerable situation. This must be remedied as soon as possible, either by limiting Japanese imports or increasing European exports to Japan, or by a combination of the two. But it is not possible for us to continue buying Japanese goods with borrowed money. Equilibrium in the trade balance must be restored.

[Question] Did you get the impression that the European Community could act as a mediator between the United States and Japan?

[Answer] I had the feeling that Japan is sensitive to criticism coming from both the United States and Europe, but I think it would be an exaggeration to say, on that basis, that the EEC might act as a mediator. Perhaps we will be able to develop our arguments more convincingly and in a less aggressive climate, but I do not see how Europe could exert more decisive influence than that.

[Question] Do you believe that in its negotiations with Japan, Europe will be capable of presenting a united front? Will not certain countries try to negotiate separately?

[Answer] If Europe has remembered the lessons of the past, I hope it will be able to present a united front when the Commission formulates specific proposals. This is not a matter of threats, but of possibilities. It would happen if Japan does not take steps to improve the trade balance between itself and the EEC.

I believe that the period between now and the "summit meeting" in Versailles this June may be decisive in that respect.

[Question] Have you received promises of Japanese support for the idea that Europe as such should be present at that summit meeting?

[Answer] Europe will be represented in any case by the Commission's chairman, but the question is whether the prime minister of the country occupying the chair will also be admitted. Until now, those meetings by representatives of the United States, Canada, Japan, France, the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy have been held when the European Council of Ministers was being chaired by a major country. Now, for the first time, it is the turn of a small country--Belgium--to occupy the chair. I don't yet know how the big countries will react.

[Question] During a press conference in Tokyo, you pointed out to the Japanese, in connection with GATT and the OECD, that when one is a member of a club, one must respect the rules. What did you mean by that?

[Answer] What it means is that if the Japanese enforce restrictive import measures and increase the number of administrative difficulties, and if they do not

dismantle the nontariff barriers erected against the entry of goods from countries belonging to the Community, they must expect the other members of those organizations to invoke one of the articles in those agreements calling for sanctions against countries that do not respect the rules.

[Question] When you say nontariff barriers, what are you referring to?

[Answer] To inspection measures, the imposition of standards, and other technical obstacles other than customs tariffs.

The Japanese assure us that they have already taken steps toward greater flexibility in certain areas and are announcing new measures of that kind. We are curious to find out what they will be.

[Question] I have been assured locally that all foreign trade is controlled by a few very large import-export firms, which import only products that assure them of a big profit and do not compete with goods manufactured by firms belonging to their own industrial groups. Since those firms also control advertising through part ownership of the media, it is impossible to bypass them.

[Answer] That is a well-known phenomenon, especially where distribution is concerned. If you are not accepted in the channels controlled by those firms--the trading companies--you have little chance of selling anything.

So I must say that at present, the Japanese market is not open in the sense in which we use that term.

I tried to draw the attention of my Japanese interlocutors to the seriousness of the problem presenting itself to Europe. I tried to convince them that our two sides should get together to iron out those difficulties. Otherwise, we are headed for a trade war, which would be very harmful for both Europe and Japan.

We experienced a comparable situation before the war. One reason why the Common Market was established was that we wanted to prevent the economic heresies of the period between the wars: autarky, protectionism, quotas, and so on.

[Question] You said that you also had a political mission. What was it?

[Answer] The Community's Council of Ministers has a double function: to see that the treaties are respected within the Community itself and to oversee political cooperation.

In that latter area, I have noted that Japan is feeling increasingly obliged to come out of its shell. Until now, that economic giant has been able to content itself with a minor role on the international stage. Because of its geopolitical position and its economic importance, it is now being constrained to assume responsibilities on the international level.

And in that connection, I think I can say that the position of the 10 is often attractive to Japan. After investigating the facts, Tokyo has several times

supported the stands adopted by the Community, but at least for the present, it does not want to institutionalize its relations with us. The Japanese are pragmatic: they wait to see what Europe decides to do and then, on a case-by-case basis, adopt the same positions, but without any institutional tie. When we discussed East-West relations, Poland, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, the reception was excellent, and those problems were considered in a constructive manner. But I repeat: the Japanese Government mistrusts all institutional ties.

[Question] One last question, Mr Minister: during a conversation in Tokyo, I heard you say that the Japanese challenge was not economic but mental. Could you clarify your meaning?

[Answer] Following the talks I had with Belgian specialists living there, who explained to me the Japanese phenomenon and the secret of that country's fantastic expansion, I noted that in all areas--even those such as fashion, which we thought were the exclusive preserve of the Western countries--the Japanese are going in for production and sales with unbelievable dynamism. We are regularly outdone by the quality and price of their products.

The result is a defensive reaction in many sectors in the United States and Europe, and that explains the tensions we have just been discussing. But I believe that the Japanese challenge is of a mental rather than an economic nature. The Japanese approach to problems and their way of preparing for the future are increasingly different from the mentality that prevails in the West.

Their way of working and organizing and their work ethic, view of society, and determination, zeal, and diligence in wanting to achieve something, overcome the difficulties, and create new products--that is the secret of the Japanese.

A Jesuit that I met over there pointed out to me that Europe has dominated the world for 10 centuries, but that those days are gone for good.

In addition to the United States and Japan, there is also South Korea, whose expansion is worrying Japan. Japan is in danger of being beaten in its turn. But those are young nations struggling to work their way up.

[Question] In your opinion, is Europe too conservative?

[Answer] That is obvious! Moreover, it is absorbed in undermining the enthusiasm of anyone trying to embark on something new. The economy suffers from the inflexibilities that keep it jammed from every direction.

That is where the real challenge lies.

It is not by a protectionist reflex that we will safeguard the future, but by attacking the problems of our time with, if possible, more intelligence and enthusiasm than our competitors.

11798

CS0: 3100/512

BRIEFS

RECORD JOBLESS RATE POSTED--New, gloomy figures for the economic development were presented yesterday by the Department of Statistics. First, the import of goods increased very sharply from January to February, if unadjusted for seasonal variations. The foreign trade deficit was in February 1,260 million kroner, as against a deficit of only 415 million kroner in February of 1981. The export of goods has only increased to a minor extent. Second, a new statement shows that, on January of 1982, the average unemployment rate was 262,000 (figure adjusted for seasonal variations). This corresponds to a 10 percent unemployment rate of the labor force. Seasonally adjusted unemployment figures have never been higher than this. Third, living costs (consumer costs) continue to increase. From January to February, the price level rose by 0.6 percent, with the result that the average living costs of a family today are 11.8 percent higher than 12 months ago. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Mar 82 Sec III p 1] 7262

CSO: 3106/90

LAINE DISCUSSES OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET TRADE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Mar 82 p 17

[Article: "Economic Commission Chairman Jeremu Laine: 'Difficulties Well Under Control in Soviet Trade'"]

[Text] Instability and factors other than those anticipated have also accompanied trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. So far, however, the difficulties have been kept unexpectedly well under control, Finnish-Soviet Economic Commission chairman Jeremu Laine (Social Democrat) says.

"The mechanism built into our trade with the Soviet Union has well-nigh completely prevented the more or less enduring trade balance problems created in any country by international price fluctuations in general."

According to Laine, who spoke at the seminar on trade with the East arranged by the STTK [Finnish Central Federation of Technical Functionaries], because of today's major price fluctuations, the long-term program and the general agreements too can in future serve only as guidelines.

"Alongside them, we need mechanisms that protect the undisturbed development of trade in a way useful for both countries."

As an example, he chose the so-called Arctic Project, which includes very multi-directional development operations, planning and opportunities for supplying equipment and facilities.

Implementation of the big new export sector within the framework of a bilateral balance of trade may give rise to a rather problematic situation. In Laine's opinion, aside from a certain amount of implementation of exports, we will in future have to look into bilateral trade tied to the trade balance as well.

"The sharp increase in exports to the Soviet Union these past couple of years has above all been possible because certain consumer-goods industries have abandoned their share of Western export markets, and also to a certain extent their shipments to Finland, and moved fairly directly and hastily to assume their share of the increase in exports to the Soviet Union gushing from our oil debt."

According to Laine, the shoe industry, for example, has now gone into a clammy slump, looking for rejected channels back to more evenly distributed markets.

In 1980-1981, 80 percent of shoe-industry exports were directed toward the Soviet Union, whereas the corresponding figure in the mid-1970's was about half that. During the last few months alone, as much as 90 percent of the industry's exports went to our eastern neighbor.

According to Laine, the outlook for overall export growth is still attractive if only trade can be balanced for even a few years on firm ground.

"Several dozen projects are in the offing, some of which are already in the agreement or bidding stage, or on which there is at least far-reaching mutual understanding."

According to Laine, as a whole, Finland will in future too depend on the protection of its import growth potential, nor can things just be left to certain specialized branches of trade officials to take care of either.

Laine laid particular emphasis on diversification of the selection of imports and at the same time wondered why the increase in natural gas imports was received in such a surprisingly tame way.

Finland cannot wait forever for the Soviet Union to generously be ready to increase gas shipments since it is sharply increasing its shipments to Western European countries among others, Laine reminded us.

Kari Nars, the director of the Bank of Finland, is of the opinion that imports from the Soviet Union will increase in value by only a couple of percentage points — if that much.

According to him, lowering it further will lead to a slight reduction in import volume next year.

During the past few months Finnish officials have collected lists of desired imports so that trade can be maintained at the present level.

"However, a particular problem is the fact that sluggish investment activity and consumption in Finland's current zero-growth economy will weaken opportunities for increasing import volume," Nars said.

11,466
CSO: 3107/97

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY SEEN CAUSING PROBLEM FOR SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Mar 82 p 10

[Editorial: "Territory of Socialist People's Party"]

[Text] The Socialist People's Party has a central committee which has become used to taking a political responsibility when the opportunity arises. The opportunity has already arisen a few times since the elections to the Folketing last December, and the opportunity will continue to arise as long as there is cooperation between the government and the Socialist People's Party. That is why the government must be prepared for the fact that it will sometimes be difficult to complete decisive negotiations. For a certain central committee will be shuffling from foot to foot at the door of the negotiations room, anxious to take a political responsibility.

During the past weekend, the central committee of the Socialist People's Party held a meeting with the entire political situation on its agenda. During the previous devaluation crisis, the Socialist People's Party was on the point of being brought into the situation where it would have to take a position on extensive economic policy measures of intervention in a single evening or night. As is well-known, the devaluation failed the way it had been arranged by the government, but a new devaluation may come up for discussion, or other forms of economic emergency measures may become necessary. That is why the central committee of the Socialist People's Party felt that it would have to seize the responsibility even before it became something quite tangible.

The result of the meeting of the central committee may be summed up as a delimitation of the territory which the Socialist People's Party regards as its own. The main signal is that if the government wants to pursue an incomes policy, or to carry through a tightening of the financial policy with negative consequences in the employment sector, this will be an infringement of the territory of the Socialist People's Party. Therefore, a lengthy discussion is already now developing as to what will happen when the government infringes the said territory. Will writs be issued for an election, or will a new government be formed without an election?

This discussion on government formation is without any major interest compared to the fact that the government has now been brought into the situation where it will be difficult to imagine how it can continue on its present parliamentary basis. The government cannot just use the devaluation as an instrument. On this, it has been expressly instructed both by its partners in the European monetary cooperation and by the Socialist People's Party. The government has now been further told that it cannot present any proposals for financial policy intervention if such measures will have a negative effect on the employment situation. The Socialist People's Party has instead pointed to a fiscal policy cooperation, the purpose of which would be tightening of the financial policy without any adverse effect on the employment situation. But a cooperation of this nature will, at best, have to be of such a long duration that it is completely inapplicable in the acute political and economic situation which is imminent.

The central committee of the Socialist People's Party has taken its stand. However, if the big words which were uttered at the meeting of the central committee will hold true, such a stand will prevent future possibilities of action on the part of the government.

7262

CSO: 3106/90

CDU/FDP LANDTAG COALITIONS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 82 p 12

/Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "Situation Clear for One Year"/

/Text/ Until spring next year the Union parties will keep a "pure" majority in the Bundesrat. The five Laender governed by the CDU or CSU alone are Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein. Between them these Laender dispose of 23 of the 41 Bundesrat seats. Votes, slightly graded by population (from 3-5), are cast by the Land governments. Berlin's four seats are added to the 41 but do not count in votes relating to legislation. They do count in matters affecting the agenda, but it is rare that such issues arouse politically motivated conflicts in the Bundesrat. Since the Berlin seats changed to the CDU/CSU from the SPD/FDP coalition, the Union has had a solid "agenda majority" in the Bundesrat--27 to 15, not counting the "special" seats of the Saarland, governed by a CDU/FDP coalition.

If the Union had failed to successfully defend its absolute majority in Lower Saxony last Sunday, the Union would actually have lost its majority in the Bundesrat due to this special situation in the Saarland. From June onward (the Lower Saxony elections were held some time before the end of the election period), the votes exclusively commanded by the Union would then have dropped to 18. It would have been impossible any longer to talk of a "Union majority" in the Bundesrat because all decisions of that body require a majority of votes by members fully qualified to vote, whether it is a matter of an objection (which may be overridden by the Bundestag) to some legislation, the (final) refusal of enactment, or an appeal to the arbitration committee. Firmly bound to the SPD at the federal level, the FDP must reserve to itself the right of taking into consideration the wishes and intentions of the Bonn coalition when entering into local coalitions with the CDU. On some occasions this does not fully respond to FDP wishes.

An illuminating example is offered by Lower Saxony. There the FDP would have had to insist that a Lower Saxony Land government dependent on it should approve the increase in the value-added tax in the Bundesrat. Bonn's pressure on the Lower Saxony FDP would have been strong indeed, although both those who would have exerted the pressure as well as those reaction to it would by no means have been convinced of the sense and purpose of the measure in question. Before the Lower Saxony elections, therefore, FDP Land chairman Juergens returned a noncommittal answer to the question raised by the SPD as to what the FDP's attitude would be to

the increase in the value-added tax in the case of a Lower Saxony coalition with the CDU. He said that everything needed to be discussed in a coalition, and the discussion would certainly include this topic.

However, all those reflections are no more than theory. Possibly something might change in the Bundesrat (and that to the disadvantage of the Bonn coalition) as a consequence of two Landtag elections later this year, Hamburg in June and Hesse in the fall. The SPD governs Hamburg on its own, the last SPD/FDP coalition in any federal Land rules in Hesse. Elections are also due in Bavaria later in the fall, but nobody seriously believes that the CSU could possibly lose the absolute majority. It is conceivable that Union Land governments may allow their operations in the Bundestag to be influenced to some extent by the considerations of their actions tending to encourage or discourage the FDP's readiness to enter into a coalition. The FDP's poor showing in Lower Saxony and the appearance of a fourth (Green) party there too actually tends to weaken the CDU's inclination to regard the FDP as a possible coalition partner. On the other hand the FDP might in the long run be inclined to move away from the SPD, a party obviously struck by electoral misfortune. Spread above all of this is the layer of fog emitted by Bonn; CDU chairman Kohl still seems to preserve his old tenderness--if not toward the FDP as a party, at least toward its chairman Genscher. Moreover, Strauss has lately talked about the FDP in terms reminiscent of those used by a bourgeois father about his errant son.

Disregarding these more personal quirk--relating to Bonn rather than to Munich--the Bavarian FDP has little chance of influencing the Land government in its behavior in the Bundesrat. Even before the last Landtag election the FDP refrained from a "coalition statement," simply because this would have sounded rather ridiculous in view of an about 60 percent CDU majority (a little above before, a little below after). The Bavarian FDP thus does not have any real incentive to really contemplate whether to favor a coalition with the CSU or one with the SPD. Some people in the party are "right wing," for example Land chairman Ertl (about to retire) and (lately) state minister Hamm-Bruecher of the ministry for foreign affairs; on the other hand others are just as definitely on the left.

In Baden-Wuerttemberg the CDU governs with an electoral majority of 53.4 percent. Given the current favorable public opinion, the CDU has little reason longingly to look at the FDP like a shipwrecked mariner at the lifeboat (though, to be sure, federal elections are still 2 years away). Rather is it up to the FDP by "bourgeois" conduct to recommend itself to the CDU as a partner and, at the same time, take votes away from it. Baden-Wuerttemberg Land chairman Morlok has been depicted in just such a light by federal chairman Genscher. This careful staging was unfortunately upset by the sudden descent of the curtain (it is to be hoped that it was not the iron curtain) when--at the end of February--the Land party congress called for a nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe, despite Bundestag fraction chairman Mischnick's almost passionate defense of FDP defense policies.

Intensive efforts to achieve a partnership have been made by the CDU and FDP in Rhineland-Palatinate. Here the CDU governs with a small majority (50.1 percent at the 1979 election), while the FDP--at 6.4 percent--cannot boast a sparkling performance. Their efforts ultimately came to grief on a veto of the FDP's federal executive. Despite the FDP principle not to enter into coalitions with parties enjoying

an absolute majority, the Land party (admittedly beset by certain personal difficulties) would have quite liked to create the prerequisites for a CDU/FDP government following the spring 1983 elections, hoping thereby to impress the voters.

Schleswig-Holstein's CDU government rules with a majority in the Landtag, although it only received 48.3 percent of the vote. It could be expected to welcome FDP willingness to enter a coalition. However, minister president Stoltenberg need not suffer the pangs of having to make a decision. The Land FDP is so strongly influenced by the "left" that it would need a severe setback for the party in the regional elections until next spring to make the thought palatable that Genscher's oft claimed "openness" might at some time include a coalition with the CDU. Though the FDP has a "right" Land chairman in the person of farmer Ronneburger (who is not at all pleased to be described as something of a stranger in his party), the Schleswig-Holstein FDP is a largely left leaning organization of the new class of certain public servants, dependent on the social state.

It is questionable whether the unique phenomenon of a CDU/FDP coalition in the Saarland will persist. Land chairman and deputy minister president Klumpp will soon retire. This will loosen one tie of this coalition within the FDP. It remains to be seen what will happen after Klumpp. We are thus left with considering those Laender where the FDP reigns in conjunction with the SPD or is wedded to such a coalition by tradition and interest. So far there are no indications that the Bremen FDP under chairman Lahmann (rather left of center) might opt for the CDU. The likelihood is far greater that the old Bremen city hall coalition of SPD and FDP will return after the elections in late 1983 than that the CDU with its paltry 31.5 percent (at the last election) might turn into an attraction for the FDP, because for the latter the bottom line is always the issue of co-government.

Matters might turn out slightly different for the CDU in view of Kieps candidacy. Still, the possibility is a bit remote that the CDU could jump from its 37 percent close to the capacity to govern. Currently the FDP has opted for the SPD. Last not least there is Hesse, the last Land upholding the "social-liberal" model. Here the FDP is distressed by internal disputes--whether to stay loyal to the coalition with the SPD in consideration of Bonn, or whether to announce a change, something the FDP always proclaims to be its ideal goal when it is intent on superseding a long-standing CDU government. In the end the party will probably agree to keep its options open. It will depend on developments in Bonn and also on FDP results in Hamburg whether this will include leaning to one side or the other.

Still, all these are the finer points considered by professional politicians. They may be extremely pleased with details of pro or anti coalition statements as conceived, formulated and adopted by committees. The public is crude enough to decide from the aspect whether it is or is not satisfied with a particular party. At the present time the FDP stands and falls with the SPD--that is how it wanted to play the game, and now it must bear the burden.

11698

CSO: 3103/369

FUTURE OF GREENS EXAMINED: ADJUSTMENT OR UTOPIA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Mar 82 p 1

/Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "Who Are These Greens?"

/Text/ The Greens certainly have no cause for complaint. If one includes the sub-species "alternatives" in Berlin, they are now moving into the fourth Landtag, that of Hanover. That they nevertheless complain of discrimination and lack of understanding is in part due to the hyperbole of politics, in part to the expression of an absolutism that raises up exaggerated claims.

Since they are a new and still coalescing party, it is not surprising that the Greens present themselves in very different ways (using the symbolism of colors they range via multicolored to red). The Greens take up earlier ecological concerns and also attract older people of the type backpacker. It is probably due to this aspect that the SPD has not been able to think of anything better than to call the Greens "neoconservatives."

'Conservative' is surely the wrong term to use for the Greens. They have assumed a new vital consciousness that issues largely from the young: Disgust with the industrial society, rejection of the division of labor (alleged to result in "alienation"), a claim to self-determining that far exceeds anything customary before. It is not an argument against the Greens that many who vote for them are able to enjoy the luxury of disgust with technology: The "old parties" and even the SPD had and still have followers who prefer to indulge in ideals rather than live the reality they claim to desire. It is a more serious dilemma of the Greens that they are compelled by their wish for man to exercise caution and reserve in the "utilization" of nature (and also of himself) to rely on the intervention of the state, although they reject precisely this state as the guardian of the current forms of production as well as the creator and guardian of a system they regard as repressive. Here we have a long and open border with Marxism.

Marxists may point out that their ideas have many similarities with those of the Greens. True, from the aspect of respect for nature, the reality in the Eastern Bloc is rather depressing by comparison with the Federal Republic, but doctrinaires are not interested in realities. The absolute faith in the strength of their own ideals seduces many Greens to suffer the companionship of left extremists, according to the slogan: What harm can a few communists do if they merely champion nature with us? The conviction that self-determination is bound by itself to lead to the righteous

path, and that man liberated from compelling force must act correctly, allows attitudes to arise, which are perilous in this our real world. They lead to the absurd notion that the Greens own ideas would prevail "free of violence," even vis-a-vis Soviet imperialism (which most Greens acknowledge). And yet they say that neither NATO nor counterarming are needed. Should the Soviets really invade, it would still be possible to take to the woods and act like partisans.

A schizophrenic relationship with the state system accompanies the Greens in their endeavor to become part of just this system. If, after decades, the courts for example decide in favor of a power plant, many Greens unceremoniously opt for a kind of "violence" that they claim to be peaceful behavior. Subsequently they complain of government repression as justifying "counterforce." Very pleasant representatives of Green policies often assert with disarming frankness that those who reject Green policies, rooted in "life," would simply have to be compelled to acceptance for their own good. But by whom? That compulsion would, after all, have to be exercised by the state that, at some future time, might come under Green rule? The doctrine of the "rank and file democracy," practiced in a touchingly absurd manner by self-imposed obligations to relinquish seats after a certain time (as was decided in Lower Saxony), comes perilously close to a cadre policy like that of democratic centralism, that is an authoritarian "democratic" method of government, and certainly alien to the democratic representative system in use here. For the Greens an imperative mandate is almost a matter of course. Admittedly, even Green office holders tend to remember the benefits of the free mandate (without saying so), and thereby accept part of the state system.

Should we, then, think of the Greens as a party of change on the road to adjustment by virtue of the fact that they have entered politics and therefore the real world? That question raises more profound issues than the oft described function of the Greens to push the FDP from its status of the almost always laughing third party. Nobody may judge as wholly bad the attempts for change of those who think of dying forests or the fact that fish are perishing in waterways, their very own element; who see cities where pedestrians run for their lives like rabbits, directed by tiny luminous and green men who--once the cars have had their way--order them to "walk"; who consider the dictates on work and leisure negotiated between the "social partners." It remains to be seen whether the Greens will get to the point where they can provide an impetus to second thoughts within the democratic system. Every new party must travel the road between adjustment and utopia. At the present moment it looks as if the second aspect were more important to the Greens--in that case they will be dangerous.

11698
CSO: 3103/370

JAN-MAGNUS JANSSON WEIGHS FUTURE OF MIDDLE PARTIES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 11 Mar 82 p 17

[Article: "Jansson About Middle Cooperation: Non-Socialist Coalition Government Alternative"]

[Text] For the Center Party it has not been just an advantage being "the president's party." Some of the opportunities for undertaking an independent analysis of the situation were lost under those circumstances, chief editor Jan-Magnus Jansson pointed out during an evening of discussion about the future of the middle parties in Helsinki on Wednesday.

The evening's discussion was arranged by the Respublica Society, a registered association.

Jan-Magnus Jansson stated that in its role as presidential party the Center Party has felt it as its duty to be unconditionally loyal to the president in office and to assume responsibility for governing whenever the president wished, in particular when the situation threatened to reach a deadlock.

"Despite the obvious duty of every party to watch over the country's welfare, this special bond was dissolved as soon as the Center Party lost the presidency. At the same time as the Social Democratic party naturally received greater prestige by winning the nation's highest office in this decisive manner, the party also received a very special mandate, at least for some time, to see to it that the formation of government takes place in the desired manner. In my opinion, it is important that the Center Party should now detach itself from the overdimensioned power and responsibility and that it be able to concentrate on its own problems."

In his analysis of the presidential election, Jan-Magnus Jansson asked himself whether the non-socialist loss in the presidential election was not in part due to an inner decline, which may have been going on for some time.

"The answer to that question is affirmative. Shouldn't this be an especially serious warning to the middle parties, which for other reasons, connected with the social development, run the risk of losing ground?"

In his view of the future of the middle parties Jan-Magnus Jansson nevertheless made himself an interpreter of strong optimism and faith in the future. "I am

quite convinced that the middle ideology is the one that best takes the needs of the modern human being into consideration."

In this respect Jan-Magnus Jansson particularly emphasized the new dimension in politics which implies decentralization, self-rule and closeness to people.

"I believe that this middle ideology will retain its power of attraction throughout the 1980's. Typical of the people of this decade is distrust of guardianship and a will to manage by one's own strength and with critical understanding. The middle should be able to respond to this need, and I maintain that it has good prerequisites for this."

One failing to which Jan-Magnus Jansson pointed in this connection was the lack of a living ideological newspaper. He therefore proposed that the Respublica Society should make it one of its duties to create such a newspaper.

Jan-Magnus Jansson underlined that the entire middle should still give top priority to foreign policy as a target area.

"In this connection I want to point out a danger which I find apparent. In this field the middle must not become a movement which looks back and tries to solve the problems of the future with the help of quotations and authorities.

As practical examples of target areas for the middle parties, Jansson mentioned problems in connection with the arms race, Finland's policy toward the third world, international trade and how Finland will be able to contribute to world peace.

Finally, Jan-Magnus Jansson also touched on the issue of the joint political strategy of the middle parties. In this connection he stated that on the issue of governing the middle must be open to various alternatives, and he repeated his opinion that the middle, along with the traditional alternative of cooperation with the left, should also be prepared to consider a non-socialist coalition.

"On a concrete level as well, a non-socialist government could continue with such reforms which cannot be carried out in the present coalition. Most important is that the middle does not in advance tie itself slavishly to an alternative which automatically means that the government negotiations are conducted on other conditions."

In his address Jan-Magnus Jansson also touched on the cooperation plans between the middle parties which have recently been discussed in public. He observed that it is uncertain whether one will get much further before the imminent parliamentary elections than to an election union which covers the broadest area possible and to agreements of a political nature, which apply to the course of action of the parties.

"One should also be clearly aware of the difficulties which block more intimate cooperation. I am, for example, quite certain that the Swedish People's Party will reject every form of cooperation which deprives the party of its complete

right to independent decision. On the other hand, I believe that there are considerably greater opportunities for program and political cooperation than for organizational cooperation."

Regarding the role of the Liberal People's Party, Jan-Magnus Jansson stated that there the situation may be different.

He therefore also stressed that middle cooperation must not necessarily be symmetrical. As for the Christian League, he pointed out that its potential desire to approach the middle must not be rejected.

11949

CSO: 3109/122

JOSPIN ON ELECTIONS; PSF DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICIES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 22 Mar 82 pp 132-137

[Interview with Lionel Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, by Gustav Stern and Helmut Sorge of DER SPIEGEL: "'Never A Bad Godesberg!'"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Jospin, the farmers are protesting, the leading employees are rebellious, and even Edmond Maire, a union leader affiliated with your party, is criticizing the Socialist government. Are these initial reactions to Socialist mismanagement, as the opposition is claiming?

Jospin: If you enjoy this enumeration, I can extend the list even further. But look at the facts. Even if one adds up all those allegedly dissatisfied people, they are still in the minority. Edmond Maire is a friend, but his criticism cannot claim to be an expression of the entire social movement. It is the opinion of one union leader. Certain persons in leading farmers trade union positions are letting themselves be carried away and are taking advantage of the real problems in agriculture for political purposes. The same is true of some leaders of the organizations of leading employees.

SPIEGEL: Surely the introduction of the 39-hour week, which is being interpreted differently by management and labor, has led to strikes and occupation of plants, however.

Jospin: We never claimed that the assumption of power by the left would mean social immobility--in other words, an end of conflicts. True, there are strikes, but it is no far-reaching movement but a question of local conflicts. Workers make demands, and some firms do not exactly excel in showing great political understanding.

SPIEGEL: So your government is not at sea?

Jospin: No--unless you mean to say that we have set sail for steering the right course.

SPIEGEL: In the cantonal elections, a headwind has got hold of you now, though. Compared with the parliamentary elections of last June, you have lost several percentage points to the conservative opposition.

Jospin: Of course, one cannot dispute a certain loss by the left in the first round of the election, but in this election it was not a question of national but of local....

SPIEGEL: ...with the rightwing opposition being extremely active and the left appearing paralyzed or negligent.

Jospin: The right conducted a mean and insincere election campaign against us which contained only criticism and not a single proposal. In this time of economic and social crisis affecting all industrialized countries, there are more serious things to discuss and implement. The economic and social strategy which a majority of the French has opted for and which is being actively implemented by the government is now beginning to bear fruit. The climb in unemployment appears to have been stopped, and the rhythm of inflation appears to be slowing down.

SPIEGEL: Apparently the voters ignored that.

Jospin: We have to point up the contexts of our policy more clearly and explain them better. If we manage to do so, this warning shot, in the final analysis, will have proved useful.

SPIEGEL: You will admit, though, that it is easier to criticize in opposition than to govern.

Jospin: That is probably true. Only, when the left was in opposition, it constantly both criticized and made proposals. We submitted our ideas in numerous forums, brochures, documents and projects. It is also presumably difficult to be in opposition after having been in power, because what I now see of the right in opposition is criticism, no proposals.

SPIEGEL: A number of the projects you prepared in opposition apparently cannot now be implemented. The environmentalists consider themselves betrayed because Giscard's nuclear energy policy is being continued virtually unchanged by the Socialists. Those subject to military service, contrary to election campaign promises, will continue to have to serve for 1 year rather than for 6 months. And the arms exports you declared to be immoral in opposition are continuing as well.

Jospin: Not a single one of the 110 items proposed by candidate Francois Mitterrand in the election campaign has been forgotten or discarded--not a single one. Many are already being implemented, and others are being worked on. Only, we never claimed that all these proposals could be implemented in the first year.

SPIEGEL: Future recruits may still hope then that you will implement your election campaign promises?

Jospin: We are now discovering certain problems which might result for our defense if the period of training was reduced to 6 months. But as head of the party I am convinced that we will not drop the project of reducing military service. The principle remains.

SPIEGEL: In the question of nuclear energy, you have not changed your minds either?

Jospin: We have never been against nuclear energy. We did, however, criticize the idea of absolute priority for nuclear energy--that is, the enthusiasm with which our predecessors promoted or wanted to promote the use of nuclear energy. The ideas of the environmentalists on this point, we never shared. We declared that we would have to reduce the nuclear program. While it is true that the government decisions have slowed down this development, the basic idea has not been abandoned.

We are, however, aware of certain constraints. We are responsible for economic growth, for fighting unemployment and for the country's independence. Those are factors which can conflict with the feelings of the environmentalists. There is a real problem there.

SPIEGEL: Fighting unemployment, constraints of economic growth--are the same arguments valid as far as arms exports are concerned? Instead of exporting to 88 countries, as in Giscard's time, you are exporting to 85 nations. Not a great change.

Jospin: Arms exports decreased substantially in 1981. There has been no increase but a decrease.

SPIEGEL: On commercial or on moral grounds?

Jospin: You do know very well that in international relations there exists an extremely important rule to implement treaties concluded in the name of the French state, except if there are truly serious reasons for not doing so. In the field of international relations and trade, there exists a certain continuity. We have to confront these very important rules of international life. Our partners very strongly remind us of that.

SPIEGEL: The old story, in other words: a conflict between ideal and reality.

Jospin: It continues to be our desire gradually to reorient our production with a view to ceasing one day to be the leading arms exporter per capita of the population.

We did not claim that this process could be concluded in 6 months. Such a promise is not possible if only for the reason that there would be dramatic consequences as far as employment is concerned.

I have to admit that it would be desirable for the new government to take into account certain feelings and certain expectations of the young. But here too reality is often contradictory. Take our arms sales to Nicaragua, for example; I am sure they have not shocked the young.

SPIEGEL: Following the election victory, influential personalities of your party are occupying the most important positions in government. Consequently the government is now almost entirely being identified with the party. Aren't

you afraid that the more the difficulties in implementing Socialist policy increase, the greater the losses will be in your party's popularity?

Jospin: This identification exists in part, but it may have a positive effect for us. All Socialists, whether in the executive branch, in parliament or in the party, are bound to become conscious of the fact that we either have to succeed together or founder together.

SPIEGEL: With this coupling, your party is running the risk of becoming a kind of cogwheel of the government machine.

Jospin: To this brutal question [sic] I will give you an equally brutal answer. Our party cannot become a cogwheel of the government, because that would mean its death. And since we want to continue to exist, we will discharge our task. There is but one force in France entitled to speak in the name of the socialist movement, and that is the Socialist Party.

SPIEGEL: Aren't you forgetting the head of state and the prime minister?

Jospin: For 10 years Francois Mitterrand was the undisputed head of French socialism. He remains for all of us in the Socialist Party the historical leader of the era. He comes from among our ranks, but now he is president, and as such he can no longer speak in the name of the Socialist Party. Nor can the prime minister. He heads a government of the united left, including Communists, extreme leftists and others.

SPIEGEL: If your party does not want to be only a servant of power, it must be ready if need be to criticize decisions of the head of state. Can you imagine such a thing?

Jospin: Theoretically, yes; hardly from an emotional point of view. I find it a little awkward to imagine such a thing. From the political point of view, I can only note that so far the leadership of the Socialist Party has largely agreed with the ideas of the head of state. In 10 years' joint work with Francois Mitterrand, I personally have not had many political differences of opinion with him.

SPIEGEL: No differences with Francois Mitterrand, and probably not with Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy either, but surely the situation is different as far as you and the Communists are concerned. While the Communist ministers appear to be loyal and capable, the CGT union, dominated by the PCF, as well as the party itself have already begun representing themselves as the true and sole defenders of the working class.

Jospin: This is a problem we are following attentively, but one should not exaggerate its importance. So far the criticism has not been systematic. If there is criticism stirring, we react to it. No one, however, has a monopoly of the working class, and it seems to me that the latter is seeing itself mirrored increasingly in the Socialists and their policies.

SPIEGEL. Your party colleague Jean Poperen, one of the most important PSF personalities, appears to be convinced that the PCF is bent on nothing less than

Soviet predominance in Europe and thus, in the final analysis, a Finlandization of this continent. Do you share this analysis of the objectives of a party which, after all, is represented in the government with four portfolios?

Jospin: In my opinion West Europe is too big of a chunk to be conceivably "Finlandized." The sole imaginable hypothesis, which I personally do not consider a probability, would be the complete political domination of Europe.

I don't see how that could come about without war, or a victorious war. And I no longer believe in any victorious wars in Europe. Europe is not as weak as is generally claimed. Contrary to many a superficial view, it is one of the most decisive areas of our planet and one that cannot be Finlandized all that easily.

SPIEGEL: If Europe is as strong as you think it is, why does Mitterrand advocate so vehemently the stationing of U.S. Pershing-2 missiles there?

Jospin: Mitterrand thinks that Pershing-2's might become indispensable; he does not say that they are desirable. He certainly would prefer no Soviet SS-20's to exist. In this way one could arrive at a lessening of armament efforts and at a balance. A balance can be reached at all levels.

SPIEGEL: It must be unpleasant for you, though, to have partners in the government who wholeheartedly support the Soviet position as far as Poland and Afghanistan are concerned.

Jospin: Poland and Afghanistan are certainly causing more problems for the PCF than for us.

SPIEGEL: After the military coup in Warsaw of 13 December 1981, the French Socialists very strongly criticized the "soft" reaction of the Federal Republic, going so far as to describe the Bonn Government as opportunistic and cowardly. Only a few weeks later, however, your government received the Polish foreign minister and a member of the Soviet Politburo. Finally, France signed the treaty concerning the delivery of Siberian natural gas. By now, do you think that the French reaction to the German attitude was unjust?

Jospin: As far as I recall, there were no official French Government statements in that vein. Nor do I think that the Socialist Party and its leadership took such a stand. I certainly said no such thing. It is true that a number of newspapers and personalities thought it was appropriate to give hasty and superficial opinions about German policies and Germany--journalistic ones, I am tempted to say.

SPIEGEL: Jean Poperen, for example, is of course no journalist but next to you one of the most important men in the Socialist Party. And he weighed in public the prospects of a horse trade between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union--reunification for neutralization.

Jospin: I think it would be a poor deal for the Soviet Union to barter German reunification for German neutralization.

SPIEGEL: What is a current problem in the Federal Republic is not the question of reunification but the fact that a large part of German youth has joined an influential pacifist movement which is also active in Great Britain and in the Netherlands. How come there is no such peace movement in your country?

Jospin: When Helmut Schmidt says that if a war broke out in Europe, Germany would be bound to become a theater of war on both sides, he is stating the obvious. The trauma of the time before World War II is deep and strong in Germany. We experienced defeat for a considerable length of time, but the kind of defeat you suffered and its consequences--the partition of Germany--and the reasons that led to it result in the relationship with war being felt much more emotionally in a country like Germany. It is a question of the history of peoples, of suffering and of guilt.

SPIEGEL: It almost looks as if the French, owing to the existence of nuclear armed forces which is intended to guarantee their independence vis-a-vis the superpowers, feel that they are secure.

Jospin: The force de frappe does confirm the French in their conviction or illusion that in a certain way they can insure their defense themselves. Hence, perhaps, the greater stability and sangfroid of the French people in this matter. Besides, for historical reasons, the peace movement in France is of a specific nature which prevents its becoming a crucible of different political forces, as is possible in the pacifist movement in the Federal Republic....

SPIEGEL: Do you mean to say that in France the peace movement is regarded as belonging to the PCF?

Jospin: It represents but a small part of the population. But I am not worried about the peace movement. It does not frighten me. I find it better for people to take to the street to demand peace than war. Finally, I believe that events in Poland have had the effect of a cold shower on the pacifist marchers.

SPIEGEL: German Social Democrats are following your socialist experiment with great attention. In what way do you actually differ from the SPD? Francois Mitterrand has advocated a "radical social democracy," while Louis Mermaz, the speaker of the National Assembly, wants to create a "Euro-left" between Stalinism and social democracy. Those are just words; what is the content?

Jospin: In France the Socialist Party and the trade union movement are clearly separate, whereas they overlap in Germany. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons why we are a small party with many voters, while the SPD has many more members. Moreover in northern Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic, socialism is anchored strongly in cooperatives, social relief funds and a veritable economic empire. We are not so rich and have fewer administrators, but in turn are a little more ideological. We develop more projects, recommend structural reforms and place emphasis on changing society.

SPIEGEL: Structural reforms, projects, changing society--those are slogans that sound familiar. The German Social Democrats had similarly ambitious plans....

Jospin: Since having come to power, we have discovered how difficult it is to change things, and in light of the crisis the Germans are discovering the inadequacy of the "welfare state."

SPIEGEL: This common experience really ought to bring you closer together.

Jospin: In a certain way, yes, but I nevertheless remain a socialist in the original meaning of the term. I never wish for a Bad Godesberg as far as my party is concerned.

SPIEGEL: In other words, you do not want to abjure Marxism?

Jospin: French socialism has not been affected much by Marxism. Incidentally, I think there occurred a break in the postwar history of German Social Democracy in which political opportunism must have played a part--the problem of democracy, the SPD's striving for recognition and the East German problem. I believe, however, that no party congress is irrevocable. In other words, we can learn from one another.

SPIEGEL: Are you really convinced that France can develop a new socialist model at a time when all leftwing governments in Europe willy-nilly are forced by the economic crisis to recognize the limits of their hopes?

Jospin: Are problems caused by the limits, or is it the limits that cause the problems? That is the question we will have to ask ourselves in the next 10 years.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, Mr Jospin.

8790

CSO: 3103/354

DISCIPLINE, POWER STRUCTURE, OPERATION OF PCF EXAMINED

Paris LE MATIN in French 5 Feb 82 p 9

[Article by Philippe Robrieux, former PCF member, author of "Histoire interieure du parti communiste"]

[Text] Besides the traditional address by Georges Marchais and the various speeches, the 24th PCF Congress gives rise to a basic question: "How is power really structured within the Communist Party?" In theory everything is simple. From the cell to the central committee [CC] and the politburo, problems are freely debated and the leaders elected; once the decisions have been taken, the resultant minority goes along with the expressed will of the majority. In practice, however, things are quite different: whereas it sometimes takes hours to break a tie vote between two candidates for the secretariat of a cell, the central committee designates its politburo, its secretariat and its secretary general in only a few minutes and by unanimous vote. Why is this the case? Philippe Robrieux examines the power structure of the PCF [French Communist Party].

Although frequent at the cell level, confrontations involving ideas and minorities disappear completely by the time they reach the central committee level: they have vanished along the way. Contrary to the belief of the rank and file, the higher you "climb" in the party the less discussion there will be, quite simply because the percentage of "permanent" members increases with each upward step in the organizational hierarchy until it attains 100 percent in the politburo and almost that in the central committee. Carefully nourished by the leadership and construed as "party secrecy," the atmosphere of mystery that hides the workings of the leadership organs from the view of the membership is dispelled when one realizes that the approximately 50,000 "permanents" in question are uniformly deprived of all political rights. Contrary to the 150,000 or 200,000 "voluntary" members who over the past 25 years have been granted freedom of opinion, the professionals must practice unconditional obedience: even during the congresses they must support the draft resolutions and all initiatives of the top leadership.

Today, if a "permanent" violates this unwritten law by criticizing the secretary general at a cell meeting, at a section conference in preparation for a congress, or even simply in a private conversation,¹ he will become the object of a report addressed to the all-powerful "cadre section." Created in the USSR in 1922 after Lenin was sidelined by illness; developed relentlessly by Stalin, who made it one of the principal instruments of his power structure; suppressed by the present-day Italian CP but still omnipresent in the form of its autobiographical questionnaires, which are infinitely more complete and more precise than any individual file card containing general information, this "superministry of the interior" is answerable directly and solely to the secretary general. The secretary general, in fact, appoints and dismisses the chief of the cadre section, just as he appoints and dismisses the members of the politburo as well as all principal officials of the apparatus. The secretary general is also the only member of the politburo to know the exact state of the party finances and the only one to make decisions with respect to major expenditures,² just as he is the only one (other than the organizational secretary) to know how many members the party has. The secretary general is also the only one who has access to the most important political information obtained from the Soviet leadership and the international communist movement; the only one who is able to take, at any moment, any political or ideological initiative; and the only one who uses television (on which Georges Marchais once denounced the reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat).

The other secretaries of the Central Committee--and the members of the politburo--are obliged to hew to the party line as most recently formulated by the secretary general, and to concern themselves solely with those matters for which they are responsible. This rigorous hierarchy, and this compartmentalization (which in the centermost compartments of the apparatus is completely watertight), determine the actual working of the leadership mechanism of the French Communist Party. Today, as yesterday, the formula used by the then secretary general in addressing Auguste Lecoœur is still valid: "As a party member, do not trouble yourself about matters that do not concern you. Let them be!"

These constraints--which by themselves would not suffice to enable this system to function successfully--are, however, reinforced by the element of personal conviction. Impregnated with religious fervor, fashioned and formed throughout the party school system, selected step by step on the basis of the degree of their unconditionality (which is lived as a faith and is further intensified by fideism sublimated and raised to the level of a "Marxist-Leninist" science of history and politics), the cadres of the PCF are--and almost always remain, in varying degrees--true believers. It is a distorted concept of the class struggle, one that has become a Manichaean vision of the world. It is a vision that explains why the PCF cadres were able--after having publicly appealed for a withdrawal in favor of Francois Mitterrand (and, more recently, in favor of various socialist candidates)--to vote (and to induce others to vote) secretly for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing or for the rightist candidate.

In so doing, the inner party circles are merely practicing the policy of "revolutionary withdrawal." An officer of the high command of the pro-Soviet international communist movement such as Jean-Baptiste Doumeng can in this way speak unexpectedly of his "socialist feelings, closer to those of Mitterrand than to those of Berlinguer,"³ while systematically placing his bets--throughout these recent years--on Valéry d'Estaing, to the extent that he allegedly even lent his planes to the former president for his election campaign.⁴

For the same profound reasons, the men of the apparatus are quite able--at the conferences preparatory to the congress--to defend the positions of the present secretary general while at the same time attacking them in private with increasing frequency. They know from experience that to criticize Georges Marchais at the present time is to suffer exclusion (more or less discreetly) on the eve of the congress. How is it possible, in effect, to overthrow the secretary general when the existing electoral system--based on a five-step scheme of indirect suffrage (cell, section, federation, congress, central committee and finally politburo and secretariat general)--has been very specifically conceived with a view to ensuring the permanence of the secretary general, and when, moreover, the electorate of the party is still conditioned by a religiosity whose basic credo is founded on the equation "working class = party = central committee = secretary general = Marxist-Leninist science?"

In this way the all-powerful "party patriotism" facilitates and perfects the surveillance of the effort of the cadre section. Whenever he feels threatened the secretary general need only proclaim the party to be in danger, whereupon the party will react just as France--immersed in the flood tide of chauvinism--did when war was declared in August 1914. The ground is fully prepared, moreover, because the cadres and the members have learned to look upon the party congresses as an occasion not for debate but for a "battle" to make "the party line victorious."

In other words, the PCF secretariat general⁵ has already decided on the composition of the future central committee and ratified the secretary general's nominations for the politburo--and the future secretariat--just as it has already decided on the resolution that will be adopted by the delegates to the congress.

As he implicitly admits, the official ideologue of the Central Committee has declared that he "does not know" at the present time "what leadership the 24th Congress and the Central Committee will elect."⁶ What does he in fact know, moreover, after becoming one of the 1,000-plus delegates to the Saint-Ouen congress who will ratify a list of "nominations" that has been revealed to them only at the last minute. He will still have learned nothing more when--immediately after his reelection to the Central Committee--he enters an adjoining hall and sees Gaston Plissonnier (or his successor, who could well be--or could have been--Marcel Zaidner) come forward and hears him read, in a slow and studious voice, a short speech interspersed with a few brief words of justification. The names of those individuals who are destined to comprise the leadership of the Central Committee (politburo, secretariat and secretariat general) will then be selected one by one (at last, the "revelation"). Hardly will this information have been imparted--hardly will the last word have fallen from the lips of the speaker--when the traditional

phrase "Are there any questions, comrades?" is heard, followed by the no less traditional moment of silence, a silence broken after several seconds by the ritual formula, "No questions...? In that case we shall proceed to the voting.... All those in favor?" Our philosopher will then raise his hand, and his colleagues will do likewise. The whole process will have taken no more than a quarter of an hour.

This process is in reality a delegation of powers, of the sort that elsewhere is called a plebiscite: the new members of the "CC" will have heard once again the ritual words, "We place in nomination...", which for half a century has introduced the more than succinct speech nominating the new leaders. Although this "we"--this vaguely mysterious, imprecise, *de rigueur* "we"--would seem to refer to that magical entity "the party," it actually stands for the secretariat general and the cadre section, which are in effect the crucible for developing and drawing up the lists which will subsequently appear--with everything cut and dried--in the hands of a Gaston Flissonnier. In the event that this "top security" measure proves insufficient to arrest the deterioration of the situation, the "apparatus of the apparatus" will then be employed, even more systematically, to turn the Brechtian witticism into reality: rather than change "one's" politics or leader, "one" changes "one's" party.

Among the "voluntary" members, the mass of malcontents--especially the workers, who are particularly inclined to do so--are encouraged to "vote with their feet," and once again young neophytes are recruited. In this way, before our eyes, the PCF divests itself of the generation of the Common Program. It therefore suffices to speed up this "moulting" process.

This is all the more true in that a purge--as silent as it is massive--is already being carried out among the "permanents," with a Central Committee secretary going so far as to find ideological arguments to explain--behind closed doors--why it is such a good idea to replace one-fifth or one-fourth of the apparatus at the present time. From the staff of L'HUMANITE to the Politburo, and from the cultural activists in the municipalities to Georges Sery (and perhaps to Jean Colpin and Rene Piquet or even--who knows?--to Robin Leroy in person), there are many who will accordingly be given the litmus test, inasmuch as the applicable rule holds that a secretary general should continuously constitute--and reconstitute--the leadership with men who owe their promotions to him personally. While many in the topmost echelons accept all this in silence "for the good of the party," public opinion is apt not to comprehend either the extent, or the planned character, of this maneuver.

Under these conditions, the cards are stacked at the outset and there can be no talk of democratization. The stage is set for a unanimous, or almost unanimous, vote such as is *de rigueur* at Stalinist-type congresses. For the first time since 1932, however, there will be one or two speeches by delegates expressing reservations concerning this or that specific point.

Within the framework of the basic structures of the Stalinist system (which remains in place), the party is in this manner evolving toward a kind of neo-Stalinism or neo-Kadarism in French garb. Considering only the obvious facts,

this means that it would take another Sedan to oust Georges Marchais, unless a decision has already been made behind the scenes in the highest echelons of the movement to saddle him with a deputy. This would be one way to ease him out of his leadership role gradually and discreetly.

From the international standpoint we have in any case, since the death of Stalin, seen five secretaries general of the European CP's overthrown by the rank and file: in 1956 in Hungary and Poland; in 1968 in Czechoslovakia; and again in Poland in 1970 and 1980. Each time it was tremendous external pressure that in turn gave rise to the necessary internal pressure: after veritable economic, social, political and cultural disasters the watertight compartments gave way and the onrushing tide swept the apparatus away. The machinery of Stalinist democratic centralism immediately ground to a halt, and the absolute power of the secretariat general collapsed. In this manner, destabilization results every time the apparatus ceases to follow the secretary general. In France everything indicates that this external pressure--which has increased steadily since 1978--is destined to continue to increase in the coming months. The events in Poland; the impact of the policy of popular unity and democratic socialism pursued by the president of the republic; and the prospect of the formation of a new, historic, Western European bloc through the instrumentality of the new international alliance that is taking shape among major Western European FP's, the socialist party, and major labor union federations threaten to raise this pressure to the bursting point for the system: from the cantonal elections to the municipal elections and including the elections to the enterprise committees, a veritable Sedan of internal policy threatens the current leadership of the PCF. If this is indeed the scenario, the men of the apparatus could ultimately rise up en bloc--and quite openly--in opposition to the absolute power of the secretariat general.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the event a defender of the orthodox point of view is present.
2. After consulting with Georges Gosnat, who is also kept informed with respect to the overall financial affairs of the party, just as Jean Jerome before him. This is not to overlook the renowned Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, who for his part is positioned squarely in the pro-Soviet orbit. Although not titular members of the politburo, these men in actuality occupy a post that is much more important in the party's real hierarchy.
3. Interview in the most recent issue of NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR.
4. In addition to asking this question, we take this opportunity to ask him publicly about the multiple ties that he formed with the preceding government.
5. The PCF secretariat is a political "unit" consisting of the secretary general and his entire "private secretariat."
6. Lucien Seve, in L'HUMANITE, 8 January 1982.

10992

CSO: 3100/420

CAMACHO RETAINS POWER DESPITE PENDING RETIREMENT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 20 Mar 82 p 37

[Article by Rodolfo Serrano: "Camacho Will Continue To Be the 'Strong Man' In the Workers Commissions"]

[Text] Marcelino Camacho will continue to be the strong man in the Workers Commissions (CCOO) despite his intention to take early retirement at the age of 64, included in the National Accord on Employment (ANE). According to sources in this union, the image and presence of Marcelino Camacho is still the only bond uniting the various movements which coexist within the CCOO.

Yesterday, the CCOO secretary general stated that his decision to accept early retirement had to be considered as part of the "example that must be given by the signers of the accord." Marcelino Camacho has 6 months remaining until his official retirement from Perkins, where he currently has surplus status. The retirement will also take place in the union itself although, as Camacho claimed, "I shall continue to perform the work of secretary general to which I was reelected at the last congress held last year."

CCOO circles denied that Marcelino Camacho's decision had been prompted by internal union problems. Concurrently with the PCE's [Spanish Communist Party] conflict, a movement has been detected within the Workers Commissions aimed at removing Marcelino Camacho from the actual leadership of the labor federation. Camacho's position toward the expulsions from the PCE influenced this movement, fostered by those who wanted a leadership for the union that would be more closely associated with the party's tendencies.

Camacho, backed by other union leaders, advocated an increasingly clearcut demarcation of the Workers Commissions from the Communist Party. The attrition which the union might suffer from the PCE's internal crisis, added to the desire to join labor union organizations of an international type, had led the present secretary general to restate a far clearer policy of union independence.

The Union's Independence

With this move, there was also an attempt to be more consistent with the CCOO internal membership which contains within it opposing movements within the party itself, and which has been receiving an inundation from other unions that have now actually gone out of existence.

The previous step was Camacho's leaving his parliamentary seat to "devote himself entirely to union endeavors." Since then a campaign has begun to strengthen the CCOO presence and to offer a new image of their activities. In recent months, the reporting and relations with the press have been undergoing a deepseated change, aimed at achieving greater penetration into the news media. In this respect, particular importance is attached to the decision made at the last Confederal Council meeting regarding the party use of initials.

The aforementioned media stated that Marcelino Camacho was gradually becoming the only person capable of uniting all the movements, and that his retirement would cause a breakup of the union. They also claimed that the movement favoring a more or less clearcut ouster of Camacho is currently a minority within the CCOO.

Nevertheless, the announcement of his retirement has caused a shock in the labor federation, particularly since Camacho himself has admitted the possibility of a technical coordinator who would assume some of the functions now held by the secretary general. The possibility of a coordinator for the secretariat was recently considered and rejected.

The name of Julian Ariza as a potential strong man within the CCOO has been denied by Camacho himself, who claimed: "Julian is already a key element within the organization, and his reinforcement would not make sense." In fact, according to certain sources, Julian Ariza would be that coordinator for the secretariat, although not officially. But this would not represent a weakening of the powers of the secretary general. Camacho has beside him a group of individuals who have been performing similar tasks, as in the case of Hector Maravall, before the Second Congress.

Moreover, the announced retirement of Marcelino Camacho in the CCOO contrasts with the vitality shown by the secretary general lately.

The sources questioned cited the good times that this union has been experiencing. Its reinforcement has been increasingly greater on the labor scene, and this is not dissociated from the signing of the National Accord on Employment, which has afforded the CCOO a greater presence in collective bargaining. Despite the UGT's [General Union of Workers] decline among certain sectors, the CCOO have brought the Socialist federation to positions which would hardly have been assumed under different circumstances.

2909

CSO: 3110/102

UGT'S REDONDO ACCUSES CEOE, UCD OF KILLING LABOR AGREEMENT

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 3-9 Mar 82 pp 25, 26

[Interview with UGT Secretary General Nicolas Redondo, by Sol Padilla; date and place not given]

[Text] Hours after his meeting with the ministers of labor and economy, at which the accord which had been on the brink of being broken a few days earlier was supported, Nicolas Redondo, secretary general of the UGT [General Union of Workers], remarked: "From our labor union standpoint, this country still needs a policy of agreement, and the breaking of the National Accord on Employment [ANE] would entail the breaking of that agreement." Nicolas Redondo added: "Thanks to the policy of agreement pursued by the unions, particularly UGT, during the past 3 years, this country has been given a framework for labor relations which befits a modern country, and a very low degree of conflict that would have been impossible to believe just 5 years ago. Therefore, Spanish business owners have no reason to justify their lack of investment. If things continue in this way, we in the labor union federations who have given proof of maturity and responsibility, will have no alternative other than to break the framework of agreement. And that would be a serious precedent, because once it has been broken it would be extremely difficult to put together again, not only with accords on employment, but even with framework-accords such as the previous ones."

In this way, the UGT secretary general concluded his analysis of the state of labor tension and the slim prospects for employment produced by the lack of responsibility of the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] and the administration, in not keeping their commitments contracted by the signing of the ANE.

Nevertheless, after the meeting with the ministers, Nicolas Redondo expressed guarded optimism concerning the fulfillment of the accords, "although, understandably, problems will still continue to crop up in negotiations, and in the follow-up commission." He was emphatic in stating: "However, I think that if there is a little common sense among all sides, the fulfillment of the ANE terms will not be brought into question again. At least the General Union of Workers will attempt to have them fulfilled, and will denounce any failure to fulfill them, especially in the area relating to maintenance of employment."

The meeting between the members of the government and the heads of the labor union federations took place within 2 months of the first actual steps of the ANE, after 1.5 million workers succeeded, with great difficulty, in signing their contracts, confronted with an unusual harshness on the part of management in the negotiating process, comparable only to the administration's delay in putting into effect the measures for creating employment and aiding the unemployed. Thus, of the three signing parties, only the unions (and they know with how much sacrifice, conflict and misunderstanding) were supporting the entire weight of the National Accord on Employment.

But although, after the meeting with the labor federations, the ministers of labor and economy at least expressed their political willingness to back ANE as well, the CEOE continued to act as a shirker, even stating that ANE had no reason to exist.

The CEOE's Nervousness

[Question] Nicolas Redondo, why so much interest on the part of the CEOE to block the ANE?

[Answer] The CEOE's political strategy at the present time is to divide this country into two opposing blocs, and also to make the center devoid of content. According to them, some should be on the left and others on the right. With this strategy of division, the CEOE cannot by any means allow an accord such as the ANE, which assumes a certain amount of intervention by the labor union and political forces, and hence a confluence of interests. The CEOE accepted and signed the ANE in a very grudging manner, because it thought that the participation of the labor union federations and the progressive forces in certain administrative structures would entail a kind of interventionist policy that would preclude the possibility of implementing its idea of enacting a liberal type economic policy. Moreover, facing the prospects of a PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] victory in the next elections, and with the syndrome of the Mitterrand and Papandreou victories, the CEOE is bringing its positions to extremes, to the point of justifying the flight of capital from certain French citizens to Swiss banks.

Its anti-ANE position materialized in a circular letter to its members in which, instead of issuing them instructions for its fulfillment, indicated precisely the areas which they should not fulfill. For example, they cited as not to be fulfilled the agreements on overtime, the work day, reduction of retirement age, etc.; in other words, all the agreements aimed at creating employment. Such unusual instructions for not accepting points agreed upon which the other party logically demands of them have been giving rise to odd situations such as that of the construction industry in Madrid, where a contract was signed after 10 days of striking, when it might have been made at no cost.

In short, the CEOE is terribly nervous and, although its exasperated statements appear to have declined somewhat, they have reached a degree of political crusading which I do not consider consistent with the capacity of many

business owners, who are more in favor of a modern nation, in keeping with other European countries. This is why I am not surprised that the Businessman's Club or the banks have held a dialog with Felipe Gonzalez, instead of heading directly toward the crusade proposed by the heads of the CEOE. It seems normal to me that the CEOE should finance right wing parties. It will not do so with those of the left, understandably, but I regard a nervous right wing as very dangerous. I prefer a government of right wingers, business owners who are naturally right wing, but calm, with whom one can negotiate as stiffly as necessary, but without nervousness.

A Weak Administration

[Question] The administration, on the other hand, despite the good will voiced at the last meeting, has done nothing so far but make statements, and nothing else.

[Answer] In fact, that is actually so. In any event, the administration has at least expressed its good will, and the business owners have not.

Calvo Sotelo himself has constantly reiterated his gratification at the achievement of an accord such as this. In fact, the ANE is the only economic policy that the government has, and hence it is obliged to fulfill it, even though its aim may be only to make it politically profitable later on. Because if this accord is not even fulfilled, with the serious unemployment crisis which could make this country explode, only one "slogan" would be fitting for his next campaign: "Voting for Calvo Sotelo is voting for unemployment."

But it so happens that the government is completely weak, and has a serious contradiction: On the one hand, it wants to fulfill the accord; but, on the other, it is totally in the hands of the CEOE, pursuing the latter with cajolery, like AP [Popular Alliance], and even going so far as to lose its roles.

For example, the ANE stipulates that, in December 1982, there will have to be the same number of jobs as in December 1981. While the ANE does not make it compulsory to create new jobs, it at least forces the maintenance of the same number that existed the previous year. However, the CEOE, in its attempt to make people lose all credibility in the ANE, has issued statements claiming that, this year, 200,000 new jobs will be lost, owing to the low rate of growth in the Spanish economy. What they fail to say is that, even with that growth, they could create employment simply by fulfilling the accords signed in areas such as reduction in the work day, overtime, early retirement, etc. By merely putting into effect early retirement, a large number of new jobs would be created. But they are also refusing to invest, and now they have no reason based on labor trouble to warrant their fear of investing. At the same time, they have no political reasons to warrant it either.

The Agreement Is Tottering

[Question] This means that you have doubts about the ANE's being really fulfilled; but, if this were the case, would the UGT change its strategy?

[Answer] Look, I am moderately optimistic, because it seems to me that this country has no solution other than the fulfillment of the ANE. But, of course, if after a reasonable amount of time has elapsed, making it possible to engage in objective assessments, we realize that the ANE has failed, it would be very difficult for the labor union federations and the labor movement in this country to assume this amount of sacrifice again, in exchange for not obtaining compensation. A failed experience of this type would leave a deep psychological mark on the workers, which would prevent their undertaking again not only another National Accord on Employment, but not even an Interconfederal Framework Accord. In other words, the destruction of the ANE would also destroy the policy of agreement. This cannot be interpreted as meaning that the UGT or the labor movement favors harshness, but rather that it is the objective conditions that would lead us to it. And, of course, without a policy of agreement, the negotiations would be far harder than during the past 3 years, causing a series of labor tensions, strikes and confrontations which have been avoided in recent years, except when the business owners' repeated failure to fulfill the terms agreed on in the ANE has provoked them. The proof lies in the fact that, during 1980 and 1981, when the negotiations were carried out under the AMI [Interconfederal Framework Accord], the conflicts in our country were the least in Europe, and this opened up the possibility of optimism for investment that is not being fulfilled at present.

[Question] In view of this experience, would another ANE be signed for next year?

[Answer] We are faced with a difficulty in this regard, because, in the event that we were to undertake another accord on employment for next year, we would have to start negotiating it in June or July, in order to have it ready before the state budgets were prepared, as was done last year. Nevertheless, as things are going, it would be difficult to have a clearcut idea by then of what this accord itself has brought. And without a correct assessment of the present ANE, I would not even jokingly give the government a blank check by signing another accord for next year. Nor am I by any means willing to undertake the signing of an accord for 4 years, as another labor union federation seems to want. It appears to me that these accords cannot be signed for such long periods. Even if a Socialist government were involved, I would think about it for a long time before doing so; because this type of accord can be repeated only if it has served the purpose for which it was signed, and this has to be observed over short terms.

In any case, whether or not a new ANE is signed depends essentially on the degree of fulfillment of the present one on the part of the government. The unions have done their part of the sacrifice. The CEOE is failing to fulfill nearly all its commitments. It remains to be seen what the government will do to fulfill them. I think that if the latter were not so intimidated by

the CEOE, it might still possibly make a considerable shift toward the ANE, particularly with regard to employment, unemployment protection and admission of the unions into certain administrative structures, such as the Superior Price Board, the Institute of Safety and Health, the emigration and leisure time institutions, etc.; which would allow for a degree of democratization in the administration. But, as I have said before, I have my doubts that the government would dare pressure the CEOE for fulfillment in these areas.

2909

CSO: 3110/102

CCOO BID TO ENTER EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF UNIONS SUPPORTED

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Jan-Feb 82 pp 40, 41

[Article: "The Debate Over the CCOO Affiliation"]

[Text] On 17 and 18 December a meeting of the CE [Executive Committee] of the European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC] was held, at which there was a discussion, among other points on the agenda, of the request for admission of the Workers Commissions [CCOO].

As a special guest, the secretary general of the CCOO, Marcelino Camacho, spoke at one of the sessions, discussing chiefly the serious political and social situation that exists in Europe, and stressing the critical importance of the unions' unity of action in this context.

In this regard, he emphasized in particular the CCOO's firm desire to reinforce labor union cooperation, especially with the UGT [General Union of Workers], and, on the international level, with the ETUC and all its affiliated organizations.

Subsequently, a vote was taken on the petition for CCOO affiliation, with the following results: 18 votes in favor, 13 against and no abstentions.

As may be observed, a definite majority of ETUC members came out in favor of the CCOO's affiliation, including unions as representative and influential as the British TUC, the Dutch FNV, the three Italian confederations, CGIL-CISL-UIL, the French CFDT, the Belgian FGTB and others.

The opposition to the admission was headed primarily by the FRG's DGB and the Spanish UGT.

However, the majority gained on behalf of the affiliation did not attain the two thirds necessary according to the ETUC's bylaws for actually admitting a new member ; and hence the CCOO's petition will remain in abeyance, and will be submitted for further discussion, at the motion of the ETUC Secretariat.

In a way, the agreement to postpone the final decision on the CCOO's affiliation is a reflection of the complexity of the problems confronting the labor movement in Europe.

The debate prompted by our petition for admission, in fact, proved to us that it is not merely a question of the CCOO's right to join the ETUC, but also, and primarily, of the nature and outlook of the European Trade Union Confederation itself, and of whether or not there will be a continuation of the process that has been under way which, lending this labor organization a pluralistic, unified and autonomous quality, has allowed unions with different orientations to cooperate within it.

This principle is still the concept that exists among the great majority in the ETUC. We have stated on other occasions and we repeat that, as everyone knows:

The ETUC consists of unions with different origins, and the community of interests of the workers of the various European countries, the identification with the problems facing them and the need to act in common to solve them serve as a bond of unity for the organizations comprising it. These problems are, basically, those posed by the economic crisis for all the unions in this area. The interdependence and integration of the economies of these countries have lent the workers' demands a European dimension. Employment, inflation, the need to reduce the work schedule, action against unemployment, the existence and policy of the multinational companies and, in general, all the problems resulting from the economic crisis, cannot be solved in a lasting manner within the context of a single country. In order to arrive at valid solutions, the labor union response on the European level is essential. For this purpose, union unity is the fundamental issue; understandably, it entails the exclusion of preestablished ideological criteria.

The CCOO have requested affiliation with the ETUC because they have considered this to be the direction of the evolution in the unifying process which, having begun in Europe with the construction of the ETUC, meets the requirements for pluralism and unity necessary for insuring the development of European trade unionism and union activity on this level for the protection of the common interests of all the unions in Europe. In this connection, there is being affirmed more forcefully each day the relationship between the existence and role of an autonomous, representative trade union movement such as the ETUC, and the construction of Europe, its political unity, and the affirmation of its autonomy, wherein the unions will have increasingly greater influence. In the debate on the CCOO's entry into the ETUC, these issues have been brought up, and are a cause of confrontation.

The main objection given by the DGB [German Trade Union Federation] to the CCOO's entry into the ETUC is one of a politico-ideological nature, in areas which by no means enter into the criteria to evaluate requests for affiliation established by the ETUC's Third Congress, held at Munich in 1979. The CCOO have met these criteria in all respects, to which their union orientation and practice are geared, as recorded explicitly by the CE of the ETUC, meeting on 2-3 April 1981.

Therefore, we shall not embark on an argument regarding the DGB's objections to the CCOO on political and ideological grounds. We shall give a reminder that the CCOO are a democratic, independent labor union organization, as

benefits a union which acts in the defense of the interests of all workers who are members of the organization and the class; and hence must uphold pluralism and liberty with regard to the political and ideological options of the organization's members, thus preserving its class unity. The CCOO's orientation on union policy is adopted by their congresses and other statutory meetings. Political militancy in any party, or in none, is an individual responsibility of the members.

In this regard, the organ of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], RASSEGNA SINDICALE, recently quoted remarks made by the secretary general of the British TUC [Trades Union Congress], L. Murray, which constitute the best description of the ETUC, its autonomy and its nature: "All the European unions (L. Murray says) are entitled to militate in the ETUC as democratic and loyal representatives with respect to the ETUC, and not as 'Communists', 'Socialists' or 'Christians'."

The UGT has adopted the views of the DGB. It has expressed this in a letter sent to all the federations affiliated with the ETUC and their professional organizations; a letter which, moreover, voices the fundamental concern that prompted it to oppose the CCOO's entry into the ETUC. It is a purely electoralist concern. In fact, UGT is of the opinion that the CCOO's entry into the ETUC "would constitute a great asset in the hands of this organizations." Consequently, it asks all the union federations affiliated with the ETUC to vote against this admission.

Such a position runs counter to the recommendations of the ETUC itself, whose aforementioned criteria affirm the need for cooperation among the unions on a European level. And it also, and in particular, is at odds with the necessary unity of action demanded by the political and social situation in our country.

In our opinion, this unity of action is the leading issue in being able to act effectively in defense of the common interests of all Spanish workers. There may obviously be differences in the execution of this action, as in any other country where labor union pluralism exists; and, therefore, causes for confrontation may occur. But such cases can be solved by means of dialog and discussion until agreement is reached.

The practice of cooperation benefits the unions, and reinforces the unions' power. Confrontation benefits chiefly management and conservative governments, which have an interest in dividing unions and which maneuver for that purpose.

In Spain, we in the CCOO and UGT are acting jointly, in a responsible manner, for the consolidation of democracy and for labor union action, with the signing of the National Accord on Employment, and the action taken for its consistent implementation; in collective bargaining, and in the defense of the interests of Spanish workers against the consequences of the economic crisis.

That struggle has European dimensions; the same problems that the crisis is posing are facing all the unions in the West European countries, countries

which, as everyone knows, are linked with one another by a close economic interdependence. The ETUC is the suitable union instrument for connecting that mutual action on the European level.

Why can't we wage the battle that we are waging jointly in the country also jointly in cooperation with our comrades in Europe, within the ETUC, whose union bylaws, program and orientation we in the CCOO and UGT fully accept?

The results of the voting in the ETUC Executive Committee prove that the opposition expressed by the DBG and UGT is explicitly rejected by the majority of its members.

We are not unaware of the difficulties which exist, aggravated as a result of the critical international situation and the threat of a return to the cold war, which would intensify the bipolarization of the world into hostile blocs and which must be overcome in the interests of peace and security for nations.

This explains, but does not justify the speculation concerning the relationship of forces and union competition within the ETUC, a concern that is totally dissociated from us and by no means influences the options of the Workers Commissions.

In conclusion, the CCOO ratify their demand for entry into the ETUC which is, now more than ever, the focal point of our union strategy on the international level, just as unity with the UGT is the focal point of our union strategy on the national level. And they express their confidence that, in the next discussion of our admission to the ETUC, a consistent, definitive decision will be made, agreeing to the CCOO's affiliation.

This would help to increase the united participation of the Spanish labor unions in the ETUC, enhancing the influence of this European organization on our country; it would reinforce Spanish participation in its activities and initiatives on the European level, and would foster the ETUC's development as a unified, pluralistic and autonomous organization.

The ETUC would, moreover, help in the unity of action among the Spanish unions and in the maintenance and expansion of democracy in Spain, by agreeing to the CCOO's admission.

2909

CSO: 3110/102

SUPPORT FROM LIBERALS SEEN TO ASSURE COMMAND REORGANIZATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Mar 82 p 3

[Text] It now seems that Defense Minister Poul Sogaard will succeed in gaining passage for his proposal to turn the present chiefs of the three services in the armed forces into service inspectors while at the same time placing them under the defense staff. The proposal has led to a heated internal dispute within the armed forces between the service chiefs who want their powers expanded and top defense leaders who support the minister.

The proposal to downgrade the position of the service chiefs is the most controversial politically of Poul Sogaard's three legislative proposals concerning defense organization, the Home Guard and personnel, proposals currently being discussed by the Folketing Defense Committee.

Up to now the four nonsocialist parties, V [Liberals], K [Conservatives], CD [Center-Democrats] and KRF [Christian People's Party] have refused to downgrade the position of the service chiefs. But now BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has learned that the Liberals are prepared to enter into a compromise with the defense minister so that the service chiefs, following a transitional arrangement, will become part of the defense staff. The main factor leading the Liberals to change their stand has to do with achieving the greatest possible efficiency. It is especially important as far as the Liberals are concerned that under the proposals of Sogaard and the Defense Command, there can be a net reduction of 40 positions among the personnel at defense headquarters in Vedbaek.

The conflict over the service chiefs began in 1969 when the VKR [Liberal-Conservative-Radical Liberal] government then in power merged the three old service commands with the small defense staff in the newly-established defense command. The defense command assumed responsibility for materiel, finances, readiness, operations, construction jobs for all three branches, while the service chiefs retained responsibility for training, inspection and personnel administration. In 1973, personnel administration was also taken away from the service chiefs at the same time as the headquarters in Vedbaek were built. With the present proposal the service chiefs, who now have small service staffs of around 30 people each, will become inspectors in the defense staff, leading to a further reduction in their staffs. In

general they will have the same duties they have had in the past but now they will be subordinate to the defense staff and the defense chief.

One of the main Conservative reasons for trying to maintain the present system is that the service chiefs can function as a kind of appeals organ for decisions made by the defense staff.

The Liberals' moderating viewpoint comes just before defense spokesmen from V, K, CD and KRF are to meet with Poul Sogaard to clarify their positions. The meeting is expected to take place tomorrow or Wednesday.

6578

CSO: 3106/92

NEW ARMS EXPORT GUIDELINES SEEN AS MORE RESTRICTIVE

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 18 Mar 82 p 7

[Article by Johann Jul: "Arms Export: Exceptions Are Made Still More Restrictive--Fraction Chiefs Consulted Prior to Export Decision"]

[Text] After more than one year's discussions, new guidelines are about to be issued by the FRG Security Council for arms export: exceptions will in the future be even more tightly controlled than in the past.

FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt appeared satisfied in the SPD Bundestag fraction last week. After a discussion lasting several hours on new guidelines for arms exports, the proposals made by a working group chaired by Egon Bahr were accepted with a large majority. Chancellor Schmidt praised them as "acceptable and reasonable" and promised that the FRG Government would go along with them.

Within the SPD fraction there is widespread agreement that "FRG arms export policy should remain restrictive." Further, that "additional arms production capacity must not occur."

There were however arguments on whether a permanent parliamentary consultative body should be created to advise the government for dealing with arms exports to non-NATO countries or to those which do not enjoy equal status with the countries of the alliance. A large majority was in favor of "consultation with representatives of the German Bundestag" prior to the government's making an arms export decision.

To a minority, this recommendation appeared to be not far-reaching enough. According to Kiel's Bundestag delegate Norbert Gansel, it demanded "reasonable parliamentary supervision." Gansel thinks that "those so-called consultative bodies which are merely permitted to give their opinion but which cannot make decisions and hold their meetings in secrecy, are entirely worthless."

However, those opposed to a consultative body lose sight of the fact that Article 26 of the constitution specifically charges the government with responsibility for arms export. Egon Bahr therefore feels strongly that the government's responsibility in that matter is "incontestable." But, he says, it is "completely evident" that the government's consultation with the chairmen and one expert from each of the Bundestag fractions will "be of decisive

weight." Thus Egon Bahr is "fully convinced" that the decision to sell two submarines to Chile would not have been made if the consultative body had been in existence at that time. Horst Ehmke too sees in the solution arrived at a "considerable improvement over the situation as it existed in the past."

One other item: the FRG Government will in the future abandon its vague concept of a "crisis area" in future arms export decisions. In the future arms exports to non-NATO countries are to be possible only if "they are required in individual cases for vital foreign and security policy interests of the FRG and compatible with the interests of the alliance and if the internal situation of the country concerned does not militate against them."

Those opposed to the above formula fear that the concept of "vital foreign and security policy interests" gives even greater latitude to arms exports than the concept of "crisis areas." Norbert Gansel for one worries that "the new formula is so general that there is a danger of exceptions becoming the rule."

Egon Bahr replies to this that objectively it is just about impossible to "come up with formulas for exceptions which would be foolproof and airtight." He feels that it is much more important that "every individual case be examined carefully and decided on an individual basis." SPD defense expert Peter Wuertz too feels that the new formula represents a "more flexible, but nevertheless more stringent regulation" than the "crisis area" concept. And Horst Ehmke calls attention to the fact that exceptions to arms exports have been formulated in such a way that they are permissible not only for the sake of FRG security and foreign policy interests, but that they must be required for that purpose. Says Ehmke: "This is a true restriction as compared with the past formula. Exceptions have become more tightly controlled."

The new guidelines also deal with this question: what happens to armament materiel which is developed and produced jointly with other countries? How can a possible export of such weapons by partners to third countries be prevented?

In the final analysis this is probably impossible, unless joint production is totally abandoned. However, if cooperation with other countries in arms production is entered into, says Bahr, there is "no absolute veto against the partner's export policies." At best, one can erect obstacles against possible exports.

The SPD fraction believes that it has found such an obstacle in the following formula: "In the case of coproductions which are in the interest of alliance policies, the FRG Government should, prior to entering an agreement, provide for a consultation procedure which will facilitate consideration of our arms export policy objectives." In other words: in the future, efforts should be made to reach agreement with the cooperation partner to exclude export of joint productions to non-NATO countries.

As far as Horst Ehmke is concerned, it amounts to the following: "The political leadership will frequently be faced with the question of either having to abandon the project altogether, or of having to accept the fact that the other cooperation partner makes exports of his own. This difficulty cannot be eliminated because it depends upon the intentions of the country or countries who engage in joint production with us."

BRIEFS

FRG MILITARY AID--Milliyet News Center--It is reported that West Germany will provide approximately DM 400 million in financial and military aid in order to strengthen the Turkish economy. A foreign ministry spokesman disclosed that the report which the Bonn Government had prepared in connection with the assistance would be submitted to the parliament soon. He disclosed that the recent political developments in Turkey had created a favorable atmosphere and that consequently it would be possible to initiate a wide-ranging discussion. However, it is noted that, due to the rapidly rising unemployment in West Germany in recent years and due to the crisis which it has created, this assistance, which amounted to DM 460 million last year, will decrease to around DM 400 million. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 7 Mar 82 p 12]

CSO: 4654/248

GENERAL

DENMARK/GREENLAND

BRIEFS

ALCOHOL RATIONING SYSTEM ENDED--"In connection with the abolition of the rationing system in Greenland, the home rule government will now start a large-scale alcohol campaign that can be both substantive and provocative," said government member Moses Olsen. "The individual citizen will be free to administer his own alcohol consumption but this is freedom with responsibility. With the abolition of rationing we must face the fact that alcohol abuse can lead to tragic criminality and quite unacceptable living conditions for families and children," said Moses Olsen. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Mar 82 p 3] 6578

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